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The investigation of a sample of political events supports the thesis that state affiliated 
companies are less effected by uncertainty arising during political events. However, the 
occurring effect is only statistically provable when the consideration takes place on group 
level (partly state-owned vs not partly state-owned). The regression on company level does 
not prove robust to control variables. Moreover, the study indicates that sentiment retrieved 
from social media bears explanatory power for abnormal returns during political events. The 
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A large body of literature in finance is concerned with the connection between markets and 
politics. The field offers a variety of directions to investigate. Common areas include effects 
of historical or current political circumstances (e. g. parties in power), political connections 
and political uncertainty introduced by political events.  
This work combines the latter two categories. The first part of the thesis analyzes the 
influence of political events on (partly) state-owned enterprises listed on a European stock 
exchange. Governmental holdings build a bridge between companies and the state. Within 
this framework, this work aims to investigate this political connection and to examine the 
effects on the respective companies. The research questions follow a logical strand. Does 
political uncertainty lead to abnormal returns? Are state-owned companies more susceptible 
to political risk triggered by political events? Or is the exact opposite the case, meaning that 
the connection protects companies from negative effects? Previous research investigates the 
aforementioned questions and theories mostly in emerging markets. Moreover, this research is 
often focused on country level. This work expands the research universe by considering 
political risk on European level with a focus on developed countries. Therefore, three 
influential events, namely the 2014 European Parliament election, the 2016 Brexit referendum 
and the 2019 European Parliament election, were chosen for the main sample.  The second 
part of the thesis makes use of the globalized and interconnected world. Social networks make 
it possible to get reactions, opinions, and mood of people in real-time. This work aims to 
employ these real-time sentiments on political event research. This thesis examines the 




In the next chapter existing literature, related work, and theories in this area of research will 
be reviewed. Chapter 3 lays the methodological foundation for the data analysis and 
discussion in Chapter 4. The results are summarized in chapter 5.  
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Political uncertainty 
The fundamental theory behind uncertainty in financial markets, established by Brown et. al. 
(1988), concludes that uncertainty inserts additional risk to the market. Risk aversion leads to 
a stock price set below the actual fundamental value. Once the uncertainty is resolved, 
abnormal positive returns occur. In accordance with the semi-strong EMH, an immediate 
adjustment is expected (Fama, 1970). The prevailing model, established by Pastor and 
Veronesi (2012), used to explain this theory in a political context, assumes falling stock prices 
as a consequence of increased political uncertainty. Pastor and Veronesi (2013) demonstrate 
that the drop in prices is initiated by a risk premium. The political risk premium compensates 
investors for increased volatility during time periods of political uncertainty. Increased 
volatility, triggered by political events, has been investigated and confirmed in various 
contexts (Bialkowski et. al, 2008; Bittlingmayer, 1998; Hillier & Loncan, 2019; Goodell & 
Vähämaa, 2013). Further convincing evidence is found by Kelly et al. (2016). The authors 
demonstrate, by observing planned political events, that political uncertainty is priced in 
option markets.  
A common type of events used to research political uncertainty are elections (Bouoiyour & 
Selmi, 2017; Goodell & Vähämaa, 2013; Li and Born, 2006). An important contribution in 
this area is made by Pantzalis et. al. (2000). The work shows that the resolution of uncertainty 
may even happen prior to the election date. On the other hand, election outcomes do not 
necessarily resolve the uncertainty induced to the market. Positive upwards adjustments are 
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then expected after the event date (Pantzalis et. al., 2000; Wong & Hooy, 2016). Other 
commonly investigated political events are war, terrorist attacks, coup d’états and political 
speeches (Wisniewski, 2016).  A non-event-based approach is the investigation of political 
uncertainty through proxies. An example for that is the economic policy uncertainty index 
created by Baker et. al. (2016). 
An example for closely related research in the European area is Hudson et. al (2020). Hudson 
et. al (2020) investigate the impact of Brexit events on a large number of British indices. 
Using GARCH models, the results indicate that risk and return on event days are largely in 
line with common asset pricing models and returns can be explained by the assigned risk 
premiums. Therefore, neither political uncertainty nor sentiment have an extraordinary impact 
on the financial indices’ prices on event day. However, the results do not hold for several time 
windows around the event. Subsequently, Hudson et. al. (2020) check for abnormal returns. 
Similar, on the event days the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for most indices 
are insignificant, but in several time windows around the event abnormal returns are 
verifiable. Negative CAARs are especially evident for short windows following events 
classified as against the Brexit. Although a large part of the returns can be explained by 
traditional models, the outliers demonstrate that abnormal returns in this setting exist and hint 
on a sentiment effect.  
In summary, theoretical models and evidential research suggests that political uncertainty 
influences stock returns. Wisniewski (2016), founded on a literature survey, expects this 
effect to be more prevalent in emerging countries due to the higher level of political 
instability. The large body of literature focusing on emerging countries is a possible 
consequence of this expectation. Furthermore, it could explain the comparably low evidence 
and research in the European area. Nevertheless, based on the findings in this chapter, the 
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hypothesis is that abnormal returns are observable during political events (especially during 
elections).  
2.2 Political events, political connectedness and state-ownership 
This thesis examines the impact of political events on (partly) state-owned enterprises. In 
order to determine the consequences of political uncertainty on political connected firms, a 
definition by case is made. The first scenario assumes a risk reduction through political ties. 
Therefore, the political linkage protects firms during unsettling times, leading to higher prices 
relatively to private firms (Ashraf et. al, 2020; Boubakri et. al., 2012; Zhou, 2017). The 
second scenario views political uncertainty as threat to existing ties. Following this 
argumentation, political connected enterprises are more sensitive and suffer a stronger loss in 
price when the political situation is obscurer (Fisman, 2001; Hillier & Loncan, 2019; Liu et. 
al., 2017).  
Liu et. al. (2017) find that the political risk theory, described in the previous chapter, holds 
true in China during the Bo scandal. Thus, during this time period of increased political 
uncertainty, falling stock prices are observable. Companies classified as politically sensitive 
experience a stronger drop. However, state-ownership is not equal to political sensitivity.  Liu 
et. al. (2017) deliver an important academic contribution by showing evidence that the drop in 
price is a consequence of a higher discount rate and not due to lower expected future 
cashflows.  
Ashraf et. al (2020) find that cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) during political elections 
in Pakistan are less volatile for political connected firms. The results suggest that political 
connectedness leads to mitigation of political uncertainty arising from political events. The 
author affiliates the findings to investor sentiment. Thus, the trust of investors in the strength 
of the political connection, and accordingly the risk mitigation, will lead to less deviation 
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from the mean.  However, as in the previous paragraph, political connection needs to be 
differentiated from state-ownership. The requirements to be classified as political connected 
in the described work are easier to meet compared to this study. Zhou (2017) finds that the 
returns of state-owned enterprises in China during times of increased political uncertainty are 
not as heavily affected as the returns of private companies. However, both types of company 
have lower returns during these periods. Factoring in the different levels of state ownership, 
the author finds the effect to be mitigated the higher the share of state ownership is. By ruling 
out global risk factors through further analysis, the author concludes that less exposure to 
political risk as a consequence of the political ties are the best explanation for this finding.  
Wong and Hooy (2016) investigate the impact of elections on state-owned and non-state-
owned banks in three countries in South East Asia. The authors find, while both types of 
banks have positive CAARs over the event windows, that the positive effects are stronger for 
governmental banks. Further, the result supports the uncertain information hypothesis of 
Brown et. al. (1988), which assumes passive behavior of investors during times of 
uncertainty, followed by increased returns after the resolution of the uncertainty. Other studies 
finding positive effects for politically linked companies are Chen et. al (2013) and Lin et. al. 
(2016). 
On the other hand, Hillier & Loncan (2019) observe an external political shock in Brazil in 
2017 and its impact on stock returns. The results support the view that political linked 
companies (along with cross-listed companies) belong to the stronger affected group in the 
context of political uncertainty. Furthermore, the results indicate that political connectedness 
is one of the main drivers to transfer political risk to stock markets. 
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Based on the aforementioned literature, a clear hypothesis whether state-owned companies are 
stronger or less affected can not be made. However, based on the literature in this section, the 
hypothesis is made that differences between both groups in terms of abnormal returns exist.  
2.3 Sentiment and Twitter 
Twitter is a social media platform that allows users to express opinions and to share 
information in real-time short-text messages. The chance to extract public sentiment from 
these tweets has attracted many schoolers to revolve their academic research around this 
platform.  Nisar and Yeung (2018) investigate the correlation between public mood expressed 
in tweets and FTSE movements. Despite a lack of statistical significance, the authors 
conclude that the results suggest a causal relationship between these variables.  The work 
dedicates the missing significance could be an implication of the small window of 
observation.  
Furthermore, the predictive power of public mood is investigated in several papers. Nisar and 
Yeung (2018) find no statistical relevant predictive power when investigating the FTSE. On 
the other hand, Bartov et. al. (2018) show that predictive ability exists in aggregated twitter 
opinion during earnings season, while Bollen et. al. (2011) come to the same result when 
investigating Dow Jones prices. Another important finding by Bartov et. al (2018) is that the 
results are valid regardless of the originality of information included in the tweet. Combined 
with the robustness when correcting for traditional media opinion and the evidence that the 
effect is even stronger for companies with less coverage, the results demonstrate that Twitter 
data is helpful in determining stock prices. Mao et. al. (2012) find a positive relation between 
volume of tweets and closing prices. On the other hand, Nisar and Yeung (2018) cannot 
confirm this relation for the British stock exchange FTSE.  
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This work uses sentiment to classify event days. That the classification of events can help to 
explain abnormal returns is shown in Dangol (2008). The work provided evidence that, 
depending on the direction of the political news (positive or negative), a corresponding 
adjustment and thus abnormal returns follow. Furthermore, this work aims to test the positive 
predictive ability of sentiment, found by Bartov et. al. (2018), in an event setting. 
3. Data Sampling & Methodologies 
3.1 Data Sampling  
The scope of investigation ranges from 2010 to 2019. The constituents of the STOXX Europe 
600 as of 01.01.2010 were chosen as sample. The index was chosen because it provides a 
cross section through all company sizes throughout the European stock market. Moreover, the 
index focuses on developed countries, which allows for a more isolated investigation of the 
impact major events on developed countries as opposed to developing countries in prior 
research. Furthermore, the index delivers a readily available group of over 50 state-owned 
companies (in context of the definition within this work). The historical date was chosen to 
eliminate most of the survivorship bias. It must be mentioned that a minor part remains due to 
lack of information on delisted stocks. The data was retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
The classification as partly state-owned company (for facilitated readability described as SOE 
or state-owned companies in the following sections) is made when the state stake exceeded 
20%. All stakes from European state-owned entities (including sovereign wealth funds and 
local governments) were considered. The ownership classification followed a two-step 
process. Firstly, the holdings data provided by Eikon was analyzed. However, due to 
sporadically inconsistent data (e. g. in classifying state-owned entities) and missing data, 
manual adjustments were conducted. Data was verified or falsified by annual reports, 
company websites and Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis. The 20% threshold was chosen based on the 
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definition of minor state-owned company by the European Commission (2016). Partly state-
owned companies and state-owned companies (over 50% ownership stake) were bundled into 
one group to maintain at least thirty state-owned companies in each specification.  
The event selection orientated on prior research (Kaplanski and Levy, 2010; Hudson et. al., 
2020). The main sample has the goal to observe expected events with uncertain outcome that 
have major supranational impact. Following the literature part, especially elections fall under 
this definition. The European Parliament elections are a stereotype for such an event since the 
result of the election impacts all future supranational policies and decisions for the next five 
years. The EU referendum of Britain, on the other hand, majorly impacts the supranational 
level by potentially removing the fourth biggest parliament member and therefore, a 
significant voter and decision maker from the EU. The sub-samples investigate different types 
of events. The first sub-sample investigates internal regulations, while the second sub-sample 
investigates events related to crises. The event selection process for the sub-samples was done 
by collecting and classifying listed events from the official homepage of the European Union 
(European Commission, 2021). 
The extraction of historical tweets posed a difficulty due limited availability of datasets. For 
the EU referendum event, the dataset of North et. al (2020) was used. This dataset allowed to 
analyze sentiment based on over 70.000 tweets during the event window.   
3.2 Methodology 1: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) 
The event study method (Fama et. al, 1969) is used to investigate the impact of political 
events on the sample. The method enables an investigation of daily effects, the individual 
effects of a single event as well as of all events as a whole by the delimitation of the 
individual process steps. The first step involves calculating daily abnormal returns (AR) for 
each constituent of the sample during the event window of a single event. The day of the 
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event is defined as t=0. Additionally, the ten days before and after the event are considered in 
the analysis. Day 10 before the event is defined as t=-10 and day 10 after the event as t=10. 
All days in between are defined according to this scheme. In order to calculate ARs, expected 
returns of the companies need to be estimated. In theory, any model can be used for this 
purpose (among others the capital asset pricing model, market model, mean-adjusted returns). 
Keeping in line with previous studies in this area (Ashraf et. al., 2020; Dangol, 2008; Hudson 
et. al 2020; Janssen, 2014; Liu et. al., 2017; Repousis, 2016; Wong and Hooy, 2016), the 
market model is used.1 The model has the following specifications (MacKinlay, 1997): 
 𝑅 , = 𝛼 +  𝛽 × 𝑅 , + 𝜀 ,  
Eq.  1 
where 𝑅 ,   is the return of stock i at time t; 𝛼  is the intercept of stock i; 𝛽  is the sensitivity of 
stock i to the market; 𝑅 ,  is the market return at time t; 𝜀 ,  is the error term; 𝐸 𝜀 , = 0; and 
𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝜀 , = 𝜎 .  The expected return 𝐸 𝑅 ,  is then calculated as follows: 
 𝐸 𝑅 , = 𝛼 +  𝛽 × 𝑅 ,  
Eq.  2 
The parameters 𝛼  and 𝛽  are estimated over a time period not affected by the event. The 
estimation window in this case will be determined from trading day -110 up until trading day 
-11 before the event. Finally, the ARs are calculated as: 
 𝐴𝑅 , =  𝑅 , −  𝐸 𝑅 ,  
Eq.  3 
where 𝐴𝑅 ,  is the abnormal return of stock i at time t; and 𝑅 ,  is the realized return of stock i 
at time t. The second step involves the calculation of average abnormal returns (AARs) on a 
 
1 Hudson et al. (2020) use both, the mean-adjusted and the market model. The results are consistent for both 
models. Liu et. al. (2017) use both, the market adjusted return and market model. The results are consistent for 
both models.   
11 
 
daily basis. The previous calculated ARs of each stock will be summed and divided by the 
total amount of stocks. The following formula will be applied: 
 𝐴𝐴𝑅 =  
1
𝑁
× 𝐴𝑅 ,  
Eq.  4 
Where 𝐴𝐴𝑅  are the average abnormal returns at time t; and N is the number of stocks in the 
sample.  In order to measure the effect for the whole event over the complete sample, the 
AARs will be added. The cumulative averaged abnormal returns (CAARs) are expressed by 
the following formula: 
 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 𝐴𝐴𝑅  Eq.  5 
Where 𝑇  is the beginning of the event window and 𝑇  represents the end of the window. The 
null hypothesis is: 
 𝐻 : 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 0  Eq.  6 
Following Brown and Warner (1985) the cross sectional t-test is applicable:  
 𝑡(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) =  √𝑁
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅
𝜎
 Eq.  7 
 𝜎 =  
1
𝑁 − 1
(𝐶𝐴𝑅 − 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅)  Eq.  8 
Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅  is the cumulative abnormal return of stock i over the whole event window and 
𝜎  the standard deviation of the cumulative average abnormal returns. The event studies 
are conducted with the research apps of Schimmer et. al. (2014).  
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In order to confirm the effect of state ownership on company level, a regression with control 
variables will be conducted (similar to Wong & Hooy,2016). The independent variable are the 
CARs over the event window. The following model is estimated: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + 𝜀 Eq.  9 
Where 𝑆𝑂𝐸 is a dummy variable for state-ownership; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the market capitalization of the 
companies; 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 the debt/equity ratio and 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 the sales growth. 
Additional robustness tests use different test statistics and abnormal return models.  
3.3 Methodology 2: Sentiment Analysis 
The methodology in this section is derived from research mentioned in 2.3 (Bartov et. al, 
2018; Nisar and Yeung, 2018). The individual determination of sentiment is done by using a 
lexicon-based approach.  According to that, every single element of a tweet will be compared 
to predetermined words, classified as either positive or negative. A threefold division follows, 
classifying a tweet as ‘positive’, ‘negative’, or ‘neutral’. In order to aggregate the sentiment of 
all tweets, a variable named TEMPER is defined:  
 𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅 =  
(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠 )
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠
 Eq.  10 
The variable expresses sentiment in a numeric term between 1 and -1. Values close to zero 
indicate neutral sentiment, whereas values closer to 1 or -1 indicate strong positive or strong 
negative sentiment, respectively. This method is sensitive to the staring inputs, namely the 
lexicon words, because no machine learning tool is implemented. The sentiment classification 
is done by using the natural language toolkit in Python. The opinion lexicon by Hu and Liu 
(2004) is used for this purpose. TEMPER will be used twofold. Firstly, as an interaction term 
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with SOE in the above mentioned equation (Eq. 9). Secondly, as predictor for the abnormal 
returns after the events. This is estimated in the following two models:   
 𝐴𝑅 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽 𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑥𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 Eq.  11 
 𝐴𝑅 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽 𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅 𝑥𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 Eq.  12 
4. Discussion of the topic 
4.1 Empirical findings for the major event sample 
The first table2 shows the AARs for the days within the event window of the three major 
events and Table 2 the CAARs for the corresponding windows.  
In the long window both groups of companies have a negative CAAR. However, only the 
CAAR of the non-SOE group shows statistical significance (p<0.001). Moreover, in the 
medium window the results for SOEs and non-SOEs diverge stronger. While SOEs have a 
non-significant positive CAAR of 0.56%, non-SOEs post a CAAR of -0.41% at 5% 
significance level. The short window results in positive CAARs for both groups. Again, a 
similar observation is made. The positive CAAR of 0.35% for non-SOE is significant at 1% 
level, while the positive CAAR of 0.56% for SOEs is not statistically significant. 
Summarizing, no significant impact on state-owned companies can be found in two out of 
three analyzed windows. All windows are significant for non-SOE companies.  
In the long window, 11 AARs are significant at the 0.1% level for non-SOE companies. Out 
of this 11 AARs, only three are positive. It is interesting to note that out of these 11 AARs, 
seven are found before the event and three afterwards. The remaining significant AAR is on 
 
2 All tables are placed in the appendix. 
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the day of the event itself and positive. The highest negative result is found 7 trading days 
before the event, while the highest positive day is 4 trading days before the event. Another 
observation is that the days furthest away from the event (-9, -10,10,9) do not produce 
significant results at the 1% level. As expected after the evaluation of the CAARs, the number 
of significant AARs is substantially lower for state-owned enterprises. The four significant 
days can be found on Trading Day -8, -7, -2 and 0 (at 99% confidence level). More precisely, 
this means that no significant AARs for this confidence level can be found for SOE after the 
event. Solely the AAR on event day is positive. The strongest negative impact is as with the 
non-SOE companies also on day -7.  
The results so far indicate a tendency that non-SOE companies are more sensitive to political 
events than the state-owned enterprises. The significant negative returns over the medium and 
long window for non-SOE companies are a supportive example for the negative effect of 
political induced uncertainty as modeled by Pastor & Veronesi (2013). On the other hand, the 
mean of the state-owned enterprises does not significantly deviate from zero. Looking back at 
the two opposing theories regarding state-owned companies during political uncertainty, the 
results so far support the findings of the risk reducing theory (Ashraf et. al, 2020; Boubakri et. 
al., 2012; Zhou, 2017). Accordingly, political connections protect against political 
uncertainty, and this risk-reducing factor is reflected in this sample by non-significant 
deviations during political event periods. This is especially evident in the medium window 
and long window. Closely around the event (short window), the resolution of uncertainty is 
observable, which leads to a positive AAR for the non-SOE group. 
Other parametric tests were used in order to verify the findings. The Patell Z (Patell, 1976), 
adjusted Patell Z (Kolari & Pynönnen, 2010) and BMP test (Boehmer et. al.,1991) were used 
for this purpose. The Patell Z adjust standard errors of the ARs and standardizes them. The 
test corrects for a violation of the identic distribution assumption.  Adjusted Patell Z 
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additionally corrects for cross correlation. The BMP test corrects for volatility triggered by 
the event. The tests are found in table 3&4. The use of other test statistics does not alter the 
findings for the large window described above. However, the CAAR of the non-SOE group 
loses its statistical relevance in the medium window. Moreover, the CAAR of non-SOE in the 
short window loses its significance when applying the adjusted Patell Z. This suggests that 
cross correlation has created a bias. Concluding, the result and explanation from the previous 
paragraph hold true for the large window. 
The next paragraphs discuss effects on single event level. A comparison between all models is 
found in table 5. Results for the European Election 2014 are in tables 6-8; results for Brexit 
2016 in tables 9-11; and results for the European Election 2019 in tables 12-14. Analyzing the 
CAARs around the European Parliament election 2014 leads to significant results at the 0.1% 
significance level for the medium and short time window. Both CAARs are positive (0.0154 
and 0.007, respectively). Nevertheless, no significance can be evidenced for the long window. 
In this case, it is noticeable that the company type is not as decisive as on the bundled event 
level. In other words, over the short window both CAARs are positive and significant at 
minimum 99% confidence level. Over the middle window, both CAARs are also significantly 
positive, but the returns of the SOEs only at 5% level. The CAARs over these periods are 
higher for the SOE group (0.0201 and 0.0114, respectively) than for the non-SOE group 
(0.0149 and 0.0066, respectively). 
 The referendum vote produced negative CAARs for the long and medium window at 0.1% 
significance level (-0.0352 and -0.0221, respectively), but no significant CAAR for the short 
observation window. In terms of company type, the CAARs behave closer to the overall 
sample than to the European Parliament election 2014. This is especially true for the long 
window, in which a highly significant negative CAAR for non-SOE (0.1% level) can be 
found. For SOEs the CAAR is not significant at all in the same window. A different situation 
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is observable for the medium window. Both CAARs are significantly negative (99.9% 
confidence level for non-SOE, 95% for SOEs). 
The third event, the European parliament election in 2019, shows a different pattern compared 
to the other two events. Over the short time window, a negative CAAR at 1% significance 
level occurs. The mathematical sign is reversed over the long window, leading to a negative 
CAAR at 5% significance level. Lastly, the medium window shows no statistical significance. 
CAARs on company type level behave similar to the overall sample again. Over the long 
window, non-SOE have a significant negative CAAR (at 1% level). The same is true for the 
medium window, although only at a 95% confidence standard. All CAARs for the SOE group 
are positive, however, none is statistically significant.  
Eleven highly significant days (1%-level) are observed during the European Parliament 
election 2014. Most of them, namely 7 of the 11, are found before the event. Additionally, 
one more AAR appears before the event if the significance level is changed to 5%. The event 
day itself is highly significant, followed by statistically significant abnormal average returns 
on day +1, +4 and +8 (at 1% significance level). After the event one additional significant 
AAR (day +6) can be found when changing the significance level. In terms of sign, the first 
set of significant days (-9, -8, -7, -6) are negative with values ranging from -0.0015 to -0.0075 
(1% significance level). The sign flips for the next set of relevant days (-5, -2, -1). The 
returns, however, show weaker magnitude (ranging from +0.0017 to +0.0028). The sign 
remains positive at the event day and on the following significant days (ranging from 0.0037 
at the event day itself to 0.0017). In accordance with the whole sample, the amount of AARs 
of non-SOE companies exceeds the amount of AARs of SOEs. The non-SOE have significant 
AARs on 11 out of 21 days, whereas the SOE sample only has AARs on 4 days (significance 
level: 1%). Concluding, the insignificance of the large window is driven by the quick 
adjustment around the event.  
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During the Brexit referendum eleven highly significant days (1%-level) are observed. The 
AARs are equally split relative to the event day. Changing the significance level yields one 
more significant day after the event (day +4). Prior to the event, four of the five AARs are 
negative, reaching from -0.0025 to -0.0088. The event day itself has a positive effect 
(+0.0021), followed by a negative AAR on day +2 (-0.0116). Then two positive AARs follow 
on days +5 and +6. The last two AARs on day +7 and day +8 are negative again. A possible 
explanation for this diverging observation compared to the first event is that the uncertainty is 
not resolved after the event day. On the contrary, the Brexit is an unprecedented event in the 
history of the EU and thus, the majority voting leave introduces even more political 
uncertainty. Still finding a high density of abnormal average returns after some days have 
passed as well as them being bidirectional explains the significance of the large window and 
simultaneously the irrelevance of the short window. 
Lastly, during the observed 21 days in context of the European Parliament election 2019, 
eight highly significant AARs (1%-level) are found. Out of these 8 AARs, six are observed 
before the event, whereas two are observed after the event. The event date itself is only 
significant at 5%-level. Furthermore, three additional AAR are observed at the 5%-level. 
Prior to the event, four out of five AARs are negative. The negative values range from -
0.0028 to -0.0051. The event date itself yields a positive AAR of 0.0024, followed by two 
further significant positive AARs of 0.0018 (day +1) and 0.0024 (day +6) at 5% significance 
level. After a sign flip on day +8, resulting in a negative AAR of -0.0017, two positives 
significant AARs follow (5% significance level). With one exception in each case, AARs 
before the event can be classified as negative and AARs after the event as positive. This 
aligns with the standard theory of political uncertainty described in chapter 2 (Brown et. 
al.,1988; Pantzalis et. al.,2000). Before an event uncertainty arises, which leads to negative 
abnormal returns. After the event, the uncertainty is resolved, and abnormal positive returns 
18 
 
occur. It is unusual, however, that after the initial adjustment (day 0 and day +1) further 
adjustments occur only after a certain time. A possible reason for this distribution is that 
closely after the event not all uncertainty is resolved. A straight-forward explanation is that 
new alliances have to be formed. Theoretically that is also the case for the European 
Parliament election 2014. However, vote distribution deviates stronger from 2014 to 2019 
than from 2009 to 2014. In this context, the negative CAAR over the long window indicates 
that there is remaining uncertainty or simply that the event had a negative abnormal effect on 
the market. 
The analysis on event level leads to two main statements. Firstly, all events have statistical 
relevance and thus the results are not driven by an outlier event. Secondly, the individual 
analysis demonstrates how differently the market reaction behaves. In this sample alone three 
different scenarios are observed. The first scenario is a quick adaption around the event date 
(EP2014). The second scenario depicts a longer lasting adaption period (EP2019), while the 
last scenario leads to a non-resolution after the event, which is equivalent to the creation of 
additional uncertainty in theory. Furthermore, the first event shows characteristics of another 
scenario, the scenario of a (partial) resolution of uncertainty prior to the event. Beyond that, 
the events demonstrate that it is difficult to establish predictions prior to the event window on 
how CAARs and AARs behave when one is solely considering the event type. 
4.1.2 Empirical findings for the sub sample 
This section investigates other types of political events in order to observe similarities and 
differences compared to the main sample. This section is intended to provide a starting point 
for further research in this area. Table 15 depicts the chosen events; tables 16-17 the results 
for the first sub-sample and tables 18-19 for the second sub-sample. 
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The first sub-sample bundles four parliamentary votes on regulations and trade agreements. 
The sample aims to control whether the effects of the main sample hold for non-major events. 
The sign of the CAAR over the long window is positive (0.0019), but not significant. 
Significant AARs are mainly found after the event. However, in contrast to the main sample, 
no clear pattern is observable in terms of positive or negative impact since signs are changing 
almost daily. Therefore, the typical negative movement followed by positive abnormal returns 
cannot be determined in this sample. Differentiating between SOE and non-SOEs yields only 
one significant return. The CAAR of the non-SOE group is -0.0036 at 95% confidence level. 
In this context, the SOE are less affected again. A straightforward explanation for the 
insignificance is the smaller relevance of the event sample. While the main sample captures 
effects on the parliament itself, the votes capture the actions of the parliament. On the other 
hand, the significant AARs which are concentrated after the event indicate a relevance of the 
events, especially for non-SOEs. The difference to the main sample is a relatively calm pre-
event period, which leads to the insignificance of the windows. 
The second sub-sample bundles three non-announced events related to major crises in Europe 
during the 2010s. In order to isolate the effect of the events, only the post-event days were 
investigated. More concretely the events are not the beginning of the crisis, but rather larger 
events within the crisis period. In order to avoid negative effects triggered by the crisis itself, 
only the post-event dates are analyzed. There are no significant CAARs for the long and 
medium window ([0,10] and [0,5]). However, both short-term windows ([0,1] and [0,2]) yield 
significant negative CAARs for the non-SOE group (at 99.9% confidence level). On the other 
hand, no statistical evidence for a cumulative average abnormal return different than zero is 
observable when investigating the SOE group. Concluding, the same behavior as in the main 
sample is observable. The theory mentioned in the previous chapter holds for this sample of 
political events, despite different characteristics.   
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4.2 Robustness Checks 
4.2.1 Sensitivity to the underlying model 
The market-model is a commonly used model in event study methodology (see for 
comparison chapter 3.2). However, in order to confirm that the results are not sensitive to the 
underlying model, the calculations were repeated with the market-adjusted model and mean-
adjusted model. The first model equals the expected return of a stock with the market return, 
whereas the second model equals the expected return of the stock with the mean return of the 
stock in the estimation period (MacKinlay, 1997). Even though the models are more naïve in 
their basic specification, they are suitable as supplements due to their slightly different 
definition of abnormal returns. Table 20 depicts a comparison across models; tables 21-22 the 
results for the market-adjusted model and tables 23-24 for the mean-adjusted model. 
The market-adjusted model yields a negative CAAR of -0.0132 over the whole sample, which 
is significant at the highest level (0.01%). For comparison, the CAAR of the market model 
was -0.0146 and also highly significant. In terms of company type, a similar picture as in the 
first model is painted. Over the long window only the CAAR of the non-SOE (-0.0142) is 
highly significant (0.1% level), whereas the CAAR of the SOE is not significant at any of the 
general accepted confidence levels. The medium window results behave like in the previous 
model. This is, a significant negative CAAR for the non-SOE group (-0.0044 at 5% level) and 
an insignificant positive CAAR for the SOE group. Moreover, the same observation as for the 
market model in regard to the short window can be made. Both CAARs are positive, while 
only the non-SOE CAAR is statistically significant (at 0.1% level). On 12 of 21 days highly 
significant AARs are observable for non-SOE (market model: 11/21) and 3 of 21 highly 
significant AARs for SOEs (market model: 4/21) at 99% confidence level. Results overall are 
fairly similar, despite deviating sparsely in magnitude. More importantly, the model in no way 
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calls into question the previous results. On the contrary, the same tendency for higher 
sensitivity of non-SOE to political events is prevalent.  
The statements that can be made when using the mean-adjusted model are largely the same as 
with the previous models. However, the results are more negative, leading to differences in 
sign and significance level in some cases. That the overall pattern is the same can be seen, for 
example, when viewing the CAAR over the whole sample. Here the direction of the sign and 
the significance level are the same, but the CAAR is vastly negative with a value of -0.0366. 
The same is true for the medium window, in which the CAAR of SOE is insignificant 
positive. However, the negative CAAR of non-SOE (-0.0078) is now significant at a 1% level 
in the [-5;5] period. On the other hand, using the mean-adjusted model leads to a significant 
CAAR of SOEs in the large window (at 5% level). The CAAR for non-SOE stays 
significantly negative (at 0.01% level). A drastic change is observed in the short window. The 
sign changes for both CAARs. The CAAR of the non-SOE group in the short window is now 
significant negative instead of significant positive. The CAAR of the SOE group remains 
insignificant. The same effect is visible when analyzing AARs. Thus, 19/21 days are highly 
significant (0.1% level) for non-SOE and 14/21 for SOEs. Although the results are not 
aligning perfectly, the overall tendency of more sensitivity of non-SOEs is even more 
prevalent in this model.  
On closer inspection, it is rationally explainable why the mean-adjusted model deviates 
stronger from the market model than the market adjusted model. The latter models implement 
market risk in their specification (one through betas and the other one by equaling it to the 
expected return). This statement is imprecise for the mean-adjusted model. One could argue 
that the model indirectly incorporates historical market risk factors by using the average stock 
performance over a longer estimation period. However, as Klein and Rosenfield (1987) state, 
the residuals will be biased when the observing period is bullish or bearish.  
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4.2.2 Regression Analysis 
In order to validate the results found in 4.1, regression analysis with control variables was 
carried out for the event windows. Therefore, three models were used. The OLS model, the 
firm fixed effects model and random effects model. Moreover, the regressions were carried 
out with- and without time fixed effects.  The OLS model is rather naïve, since it assumes that 
CARs are not affected by company individual effects. The firm-fixed model is not well 
specified for this sample since the main explanatory variable (SOE) is not fixed for all 
companies over all periods. Moreover, Hausman tests demonstrated that random effects are a 
better fit for all of the following regressions compared to fixed effects. Thus, analysis focuses 
on OLS and random effects.  
 The results for the large window can be found in table 25-28.  The beta of the dummy 
variable SOE (1 if SOE,0 if non-SOE) is positive in all specifications. However, the 
coefficient is not significant in neither the OLS nor in the random effects model. By contrast, 
the coefficient of the control variable SIZE is significantly positive in both models. The other 
two coefficients of growth and leverage do not have any statistical significance for the 
dependent variable CAR. This is true for all models. Since this result was not expected based 
on previous investigations, the regression was repeated with a higher level of state-ownership 
(30%). The justification for this is based on Zhou (2017).  The author shows that negative 
effects introduced by events shrink with a higher level of state-ownership. In context of the 
work at hand, the result does not change drastically. The regressions can be found in table 29-
32. The SOE coefficient is significant positive at 5% level in the first OLS regression, 
however, after controlling for other variables, the significance vanishes. On the other hand, as 
in the previous regression, the company size shows significance at the highest degree. The 
random effects model yields a p-value of 0.052 for the SOE coefficient. Thus, the null is 
accepted. As in the OLS model, size is highly significant in all specifications. 
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In a third regression (tables 33-36), the state-owned companies not listed on a stock exchange 
in an EU country were removed (in this case Norway and Switzerland). The purpose of this 
regression is to investigate whether the EEA agreement signing countries not belonging to the 
EU distort the results. As in the first set of regressions, no statistical significance is found for 
the SOE coefficient in the OLS model and random effect model. This result was expected due 
to the removal of companies with state-ownership over 30%, while keeping some lower 
percentages in the sample.  
4.3 Sentiment Analysis 
A further point of observation is the impact of sentiment. In this section, the focus point will 
shift from a window observation to daily observations. The goal is to classify days in the 
event window as either negative or positive (table 37). Following that, the error terms (ARs) 
will be regressed against the TEMPER variable and the SOE variable in interaction with the 
TEMPER variable. In a third step, the variable will be lagged in order to observe the 
predictability of ARs based on TEMPER. The analysis was only done for the Brexit event. 
There are two reasons for that. Firstly, the event period is the most consistent in terms of 
synchronous trading of the sample companies. Secondly, a public dataset of historical tweets 
was only obtainable for the EU referendum. Thus, the analysis is limited to this event only. 
Nevertheless, the high number of observations allow for a good informative value.  The OLS 
was used because control variables per firm are not changing. Time fixed effects were 
disregarded since only a 21 day period is observed.  
The first set of regressions (table 38) clearly shows that the continuous variable TEMPER has 
a significant impact at 99.9% confidence level. The coefficient is positive. Thus, the 
relationship is as expected. Positive aggregated mood positively impacts abnormal returns, 
while negative aggregated mood leads to the opposite.  The statement and statistical evidence 
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remain unchanged when adding the control variables. As in the previous chapter, the only 
statistically significant coefficient of a control variable is beta2 with 99.9% confidence.  
The second set of regressions (table 39) depicts the interaction between SOE and TEMPER. 
The TEMPER coefficient is statistically significant. Thus, the slope for the non-SOE group is 
positive. The interaction term yields no statistical relevance. This can be interpretated as no 
statistical difference between the slopes of SOEs and non-SOEs in dependence of mood on 
the respective day. The third set of regressions treats TEMPER as a binary variable. TEMPER 
on a given day in this scenario is either good (=1) or bad (=0). The results are portrayed in 
table 40. The statistical relevance is lower than before, however, the interpretation does not 
change. In conclusion, both groups of companies behave similar in both states of the world. 
No statistically different slope is detected, neither when observing the level of TEMPER 
(second set of regressions) nor when observing the two states of the world (third set of 
regressions). The last set of regressions (table 41-42) shows that the significance holds, 
although only at a confidence level 99%, when using the one day lagged TEMPER variable. 
Interestingly, the sign of the coefficient switches. Therefore, a positive TEMPER on the 
previous day on average lowers the AR on the next day. Furthermore, the p-value of the 
interaction term shrinks close to the 5% threshold (p-value: 0.051, t-value: 1.95). The 
coefficient is positive. 
The results deliver evidence to negate the risk reduction theory in this setting due to the fact 
that the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant in any of the models. Thus, it 
cannot be concluded that the significance of the SOE variable is dependent on the level of 
sentiment on a given day. The hypothesis that the SOE variable shows relevance on extreme 
days is rejected.  Despite not meeting the required level to be labelled significant, the last set 
of regressions indicates that an investigation based on lagged data may lead to results that 
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support the hypothesis. This offers a good starting point for further and more concentrated 
research in this area.  
5. Conclusion 
The investigation of a sample of political events, that captures supranational influence on 
companies within the European market, supports the thesis that SOEs are less effected by 
uncertainty introduced by political events. The occurring effect, however, is only statistically 
provable when the consideration takes place on group level (SOE vs non-SOE). The 
following regression analysis fails to support the evidence on group level.  The significance 
found in a single regressor model when using OLS regression vanishes when adding control 
variables. Although a positive coefficient is observable in all models and a p-value under 0.1 
is reached, this work refrains from taking this as sufficient evidence. On the other hand, the 
work indicates that daily sentiment retrieved from social media influences abnormal returns 
during a political event. Investigating both variables (SOE and TEMPER) in interaction does 
not support the theory that the level of sentiment plays a role for the relevance of state-
ownership when explaining abnormal returns.  This work offers a good starting point for 
future research. Firstly, the result on group level shows that the hypothesis was not 
unrealistic. A deeper dive on what common company characteristics created the divergence 
between the group analysis and regression analysis could be important to further understand 
abnormal returns during political events. Furthermore, using a different sample of SOEs with 
governmental ownership over 50% could yield better results, as the second set of regressions 
indicated. The focus on the Stoxx600, limited possibilities in this regard. The by far biggest 
limitation of this work was the restricted access to twitter data. The results, however, showed 
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Appendix 1: Abbreviations 
AR  Abnormal Return 
AAR  Average Abnormal Return 
CAR  Cumulative Abnormal Return 
CAAR  Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
EP  European Parliament 
EP2014 European Parliament Election 2014 
EP2019 European Parliament Election 2019 
Bre2016 EU referendum 2016 
Non-SOE Non State-Owned-Enterprise 




Table 1: AARs of the main sample 
t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR 
  
t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   
-10 -0.0018 -0.0019*   0 0.0062** 0.0024***  
 
(-1.4133) (-2.2256) 
   
(2.9880) (5.1317) 
-9 0.0008 -0.0006   1 -0.0023 0.0011  
 
(0.6228) (-1.5694) 
   
(-0.8561) (1.0177) 
-8 -0.0043** -0.0025***   2 0.0004 -0.004***  
 
(-3.1155) (-6.3860) 
   
(0.2134) (-4.2250) 
-7 -0.0066*** -0.0044***   3 0.0010 0.0008  
 
(-4.0628) (-9.1441) 
   
(0.5493) (1.7789) 
-6 -0.0008 -0.003***   4 0.0021 -0.0006  
 
(-0.4815) (-5.3140) 
   
(1.1649) (-1.1529) 
-5 -0.0013 -0.0025***   5 0.0017 0.0004  
 
(-0.8599) (-5.2127) 
   
(1.1766) (0.8717) 
-4 0.0031 0.0034***   6 -0.0018 0.0025***  
 
(1.6829) (5.0498) 
   
(-1.1086) (3.8565) 
-3 -0.0028 -0.0023***   7 0.0028* -0.0028***  
 
(-1.4779) (-3.3596) 
   
(2.5066) (-4.3628) 
-2 -0.0042** -0.0028***   8 -0.0002 -0.0011*  
 
(-2.8376) (-6.1072) 
   
(-0.1313) (-2.4496) 
-1 0.0017 0.0000   9 0.0026* 0.001  
 
(1.3632) (0.0000) 
   
(1.9784) (1.5320) 
     10 0.0019 0.0011  
          
(1.5247) (1.6676)   
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 




Table 2: CAARs of the main sample 
Window SOE_CAAR Non-SOE_CAAR 
[-10;10] -0.0017 -0.016*** 
 
(-0.2025) (-6.4035) 
[-5,5] 0.0056 -0.0041* 
 
(0.6751) (-2.1330) 
[-1;1] 0.0056 0.0035** 
  
(1.4268) (2.8835) 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 





Table 3: Parametric Tests for Main Sample – SOE group 
        
 SOE 
Window Patell Z adjusted Patell Z BMP 
[-10;10] -0.6428 -0.5052 -0.6705 
 
   
[-5,5] 0.4016 0.3157 0.3405 
 
   
[-1;1] 1.8641 1.4652 1.6846 
  
      
Market Model is used. Observations SOE: 160. Event Dates: 25.05.2014, 23.06.2016, 26.05.2019 
 
 
Table 4: Parametric Tests for the Main Sample - non-SOE group 
       
 Non-SOE 
Window Patell Z adjusted Patell Z BMP 
[-10;10] -5.711 -2.005 -5.0283 
 
   
[-5,5] -0.6326 -0.2213 -0.5757 
 
   
[-1;1] 4.0461 1.4151 2.969 
  
      





Table 5: Comparison of the single events in the main sample 
Window EP2014 Brexit EP2019   Complete Sample 
[-10;10] -0.0002 -0.0352*** -0.0084*   -0.0146*** 
 
(-0.0907) (-6.2955) (-2.2905)   (-6.0492) 
[-5,5] 0.0154*** -0.0221*** -0.0035   -0.0031 
 
(6.7860) (-5.6123) (-1.0167)   (-1.6322) 
[-1;1] 0.007*** -0.0006 0.0046**   0.0037** 
  
(6.9326) (-0.2261) (2.7044)   (3.1981) 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 





Table 6: AARs (not differentiated) of EP2014 
t AAR   t AAR   
-10 0.0013*   0 0.0037***  
 
(2.2045) 
   
(5.7533) 
-9 -0.0015**   1 0.0017**  
 
(-2.6460) 
   
(3.0318) 
-8 -0.0023***   2 0.0007  
 
(-3.5816) 
   
(0.9300) 
-7 -0.0075***   3 -0.0001  
 
(-8.4494) 
   
(-0.1785) 
-6 -0.0067***   4 0.0025***  
 
(-8.2954) 
   
(4.3086) 
-5 0.0028***   5 -0.0001  
 
(4.2604) 
   
(-0.2027) 
-4 0.0013   6 -0.0011*  
 
(1.8982) 
   
(-2.3184) 
-3 -0.0012   7 -0.0009  
 
(-1.8526) 
   
(-1.7661) 
-2 0.0025***   8 0.0031***  
 
(4.2535) 
   
(5.8563) 
-1 0.0017***   9 0.0001  
 
(3.5633) 
   
(0.1910) 
    10 -0.0002  
        
(-0.3172)   
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 




Table 7: AARs (differentiated) of EP2014 
t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   
-10 -0.0004 0.0015*   0 0.0074** 0.0033***  
 
(-0.2445) (2.3833) 
   
(3.4613) (4.9091) 





   
(-0.2623) (3.2447) 
-8 -0.0039 -0.0021**   2 -0.0032 0.0012  
 
(-1.6665) (-3.1581) 
   
(-1.2640) (1.5265) 
-7 -0.0156*** -0.0066***   3 0.0003 -0.0002  
 
(-4.7943) (-7.2522) 
   
(0.1449) (-0.3453) 
-6 -0.0067* -0.0067***   4 0.0036 0.0024***  
 
(-2.0236) (-8.1699) 
   
(1.5530) (4.0554) 
-5 0.0038 0.0027***   5 0.0008 -0.0002  
 
(1.8917) (3.8807) 
   
(0.4208) (-0.3950) 
-4 0.0033 0.0011   6 -0.0033 -0.0009  
 
(1.0456) (1.6264) 
   
(-1.8711) (-1.8407) 
-3 -0.0023 -0.0011   7 0.0024 -0.0013*  
 
(-0.8836) (-1.6667) 
   
(1.3992) (-2.4473) 
-2 0.0024 0.0025***   8 0.0072*** 0.0027***  
 
(0.9467) (4.2341) 
   
(3.7288) (4.9576) 
-1 0.0046** 0.0013**   9 0.0029 -0.0002  
 
(2.6789) (2.6361) 
   
(1.5027) (-0.3704) 
     10 -0.0003 -0.0002  
          
(-0.2375) (-0.2913)   
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 




Table 8: CAARs of EP2014 
Window SOE_CAAR Non-SOE_CAAR 
[-10;10] 0.0005 -0.0003 
 
(0.0468) (-0.1183) 
[-5,5] 0.0201* 0.0149*** 
 
(2.1683) (6.4557) 
[-1;1] 0.0114** 0.0066*** 
  
(3.4195) (6.1575) 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 





Table 9: AARs (not differentiated) for the Bre2016 
t AAR   t AAR   
-10 -0.0036   0 0.0021**  
 
(-1.6818) 
   
(2.9288) 
-9 -0.0008   1 -0.0012  
 
(-1.3241) 
   
(-0.4193) 
-8 -0.0025***   2 -0.0116***  
 
(-3.7616) 
   
(-5.2991) 
-7 -0.0034***   3 0.0015  
 
(-4.9739) 
   
(1.5691) 
-6 -0.0008   4 -0.0026*  
 
(-1.0261) 
   
(-2.2101) 
-5 -0.0088***   5 0.0028**  
 
(-9.9263) 
   
(3.2144) 
-4 0.0067***   6 0.0051***  
 
(4.1526) 
   
(3.4524) 
-3 -0.0029   7 -0.0055***  
 
(-1.7668) 
   
(-3.5696) 
-2 -0.0064***   8 -0.0048***  
 
(-8.5271) 
   
(-4.9754) 
-1 -0.0015   9 0.002  
 
(-1.8310) 
   
(1.2511) 
    10 0.0014  
        
(0.9168)   
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 




Table 10: AARs (differentiated) for the Bre2016 
t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   
-10 -0.0039 -0.0036   0 0.0042 0.0018*  
 
(-1.6031) (-1.5315) 
   
(1.4477) (2.4585) 
-9 0.0000 -0.0009   1 -0.0091 -0.0004  
 
(0.0000) (-1.4218) 
   
(-1.2395) (-0.1305) 
-8 -0.0043 -0.0024***   2 0.0060 -0.0134***  
 
(-1.5614) (-3.5502) 
   
(1.2963) (-5.6915) 
-7 -0.0038 -0.0034***   3 -0.0028 0.0019  
 
(-1.4439) (-4.8282) 
   
(-0.8685) (1.9007) 
-6 0.0035 -0.0013   4 -0.0033 -0.0026*  
 
(1.3375) (-1.5957) 
   
(-0.8072) (-2.1164) 
-5 -0.0115*** -0.0086***   5 0.0013 0.003***  
 
(-3.7347) (-9.2972) 
   
(0.4168) (3.3109) 
-4 0.0011 0.0072***   6 0.0030 0.0053**  
 
(0.2727) (4.1611) 
   
(1.1077) (3.2983) 
-3 -0.0023 -0.0030   7 0.0032 -0.0064***  
 
(-0.4669) (-1.7244) 
   
(1.3346) (-3.8137) 
-2 -0.0078*** -0.0063***   8 -0.0056 -0.0047***  
 
(-3.5345) (-7.9085) 
   
(-1.6462) (-4.6735) 
-1 -0.0030 -0.0014   9 0.0027 0.0019  
 
(-1.7439) (-1.5787) 
   
(0.8820) (1.0939) 
     10 0.0012 0.0014  
          
(0.6457) (0.8356)   
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 





Table 11: CAARs of Bre2016 
Window SOE_CAAR Non-SOE_CAAR 
[-10;10] -0.0312 -0.0356*** 
 
(-1.8132) (-6.0236) 
[-5,5] -0.0273* -0.0215*** 
 
(-2.0811) (-5.2182) 
[-1;1] -0.0079 0.0001 
  
(-1.1632) (0.0387) 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 





Table 12: AARs (not differentiated) for the EP2019 
t AAR   t AAR   
-10 -0.0035***   0 0.0024*  
 
(-5.3844) 
   
(2.2492) 
-9 0.0011   1 0.0018*  
 
(1.4890) 
   
(2.4981) 
-8 -0.0032***   2 0.0003  
 
(-4.8497) 
   
(0.2613) 
-7 -0.0028***   3 0.0012  
 
(-3.5196) 
   
(1.6100) 
-6 -0.0006   4 -0.0010  
 
(-0.5165) 
   
(-1.3846) 
-5 -0.0014   5 -0.0014  
 
(-1.9148) 
   
(-1.6137) 
-4 0.0022**   6 0.0024*  
 
(3.2450) 
   
(2.5231) 
-3 -0.0029***   7 -0.0001  
 
(-3.7611) 
   
(-0.1501) 
-2 -0.0051***   8 -0.0017**  
 
(-5.7857) 
   
(-2.6632) 
-1 0.0004   9 0.0014*  
 
(0.5468) 
   
(2.2206) 
    10 0.0025***  
        
(3.3656)   
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 




Table 13: AARs (differentiated) for the EP2019 
t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   
-10 -0.0011 -0.0038***   0 0.0068 0.0018  
 
(-0.4357) (-5.7335) 
   
(1.3150) (1.7555) 
-9 0.0046* 0.0007   1 0.0025 0.0017*  
 
(2.3548) (0.8844) 
   
(0.7429) (2.4191) 
-8 -0.0048* -0.003***   2 -0.0013 0.0005  
 
(-2.2783) (-4.3174) 
   
(-0.6089) (0.3972) 
-7 0.0001 -0.0032***   3 0.0053 0.0007  
 
(0.0538) (-3.7165) 
   
(1.3440) (1.0141) 
-6 0.0012 -0.0008   4 0.0058* -0.0018*  
 
(0.4999) (-0.6310) 
   
(2.0943) (-2.4644) 
-5 0.0032 -0.0019*   5 0.0030 -0.0019*  
 
(1.4332) (-2.4652) 
   
(1.2067) (-2.0599) 
-4 0.0048* 0.0019**   6 -0.0047 0.0032***  
 
(2.1451) (2.6761) 
   
(-1.2817) (3.3142) 
-3 -0.0037* -0.0029***   7 0.0027 -0.0005  
 
(-2.1061) (-3.4639) 
   
(1.5840) (-0.6982) 
-2 -0.0077** -0.0048***   8 -0.0027 -0.0015*  
 
(-2.8781) (-5.1419) 
   
(-1.2374) (-2.2514) 
-1 0.0031 0.0001   9 0.0022 0.0013  
 
(1.1171) (0.1335) 
   
(1.2487) (1.9289) 
     10 0.0049 0.0022**  
          
(1.6264) (2.9304)   
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 





Table 14: CAARs for EP2019 
Window SOE_CAAR Non-SOE_CAAR 
[-10;10] 0.0243 -0.0123*** 
 
(1.4798) (-3.4280) 
[-5,5] 0.0219 -0.0065* 
 
(1.1661) (-2.0803) 
[-1;1] 0.0125 0.0036* 
  
(1.3763) (2.3354) 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 






Table 15: Sub-Sample Event List 




s Portugal requests Bailout 2011-04-07 Unannounced Event within the Debt Crisis 
Euromaidan 2014-02-18 Unannounced Protest leading to the Revolution 






 ESM Treaty 2011-03-23 EU Parliament approves Treaty change 
OTC derivatives regulation 2012-03-29 EU Parliament adopts the regulation 
CETA 2017-02-15 EU Parliament approves the trade agreement 
Trade Agreement Singapore 2019-02-13 EU Parliament approves the trade agreement 
Criteria for Event selection for Crises: Three major crises were found when analyzing the data. For each of the Crisis one 
unannounced event was picked. Criteria for the EP Votes: (1) Must be a parliamentary vote. (2) In the list of the European 
Union website (mentioned in chapter 3). Criteria for both samples: (1) Not intersecting with the main sample (2) Similar size 





Table 16: AARs (differentiated) of the sub-sample EP Votes 
t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   
-10 0.0003 0.0018***   0 -0.0011 -0.0009**  
 
(0.2935) (5.2128) 
   
(-0.8576) (-2.5966) 
-9 0.0021 -0.0008*   1 0.0009 0.0015***  
 
(1.8740) (-2.0229) 
   
(1.0060) (4.2054) 
-8 0.002 0.0007*   2 -0.006*** -0.004***  
 
(1.9426) (1.9920) 
   
(-5.1478) (-8.4061) 
-7 0.0029* 0.001**   3 0.0044*** 0.0021***  
 
(2.1669) (2.6790) 
   
(4.0797) (6.4701) 
-6 -0.0016 -0.0001   4 -0.0005 -0.0021***  
 
(-1.1069) (-0.2423) 
   
(-0.3842) (-4.2121) 
-5 0.0013 0.0001   5 -0.003** -0.0016**  
 
(1.0560) (0.2650) 
   
(-2.7190) (-2.6342) 
-4 -0.0003 -0.0003   6 0.0028 0.0022***  
 
(-0.2174) (-0.7696) 
   
(1.2744) (4.2426) 
-3 -0.0011 0.0015***   7 0.0002 -0.0011**  
 
(-0.8705) (3.6526) 
   
(0.1592) (-3.0773) 
-2 0.0015 0.0000   8 0.0023 0.0023***  
 
(1.2344) (0.0000) 
   
(1.1276) (6.6198) 
-1 0.0010 0.0001   9 0.001 -0.0009**  
 
(0.8474) (0.3042) 
   
(0.5349) (-2.5966) 
     10 0.0004 -0.0004  
          
(0.3122) (-1.0456)   
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 





Table 17: CAARs of EP Votes 
Window SOE_CAAR Non-SOE_CAAR 
[-10;10] 0.0096 0.0011 
 
(1.4320) (0.5390) 
[-5,5] -0.0029 -0.0036* 
 
(-0.6785) (-2.4040) 
[-1;1] 0.0008 0.0006 
  
(0.4580) (1.1318) 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 





Table 18: AARs (differentiated) of the sub-sample Crises 
t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   
0 -0.0026 -0.0012***  
 
(-1.8289) (-3.0944) 
1 -0.0034* 0.0004  
 
(-2.2388) (1.0708) 
2 0.0007 -0.0021***  
 
(0.2935) (-4.6080) 
3 0.0008 0.002***  
 
(0.5564) (4.8574) 
4 0.0028 0.0008  
 
(1.5992) (1.7141) 
5 0.0005 -0.0003  
 
(0.3353) (-0.7941) 
6 0.0012 -0.0006  
 
(0.7897) (-1.3791) 
7 -0.0026 -0.0007  
 
(-1.5173) (-1.5373) 
8 0.0033* 0.0031***  
 
(1.9822) (7.0458) 
9 0.0029 0.0005  
 
(1.5420) (1.1780) 
10 -0.0044** -0.0003  
  
(-2.8561) (-0.7280)   
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 





Table 19: CAARs of Crises 
Window SOE_CAAR Non-SOE_CAAR 
[0;10] 0.0039 0.0019 
 
(0.4455) (1.1750) 
[0;5] 0.0037 -0.0009 
 
(0.6644) (-0.8580) 
[0;2] -0.0023 -0.0028*** 
 
(-0.7379) (-3.7977) 
[0;1] -0.0026 -0.0022*** 
  
(-1.2615) (-3.8080) 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market Model 













[-10;10] -0.0146*** -0.0132*** -0.0366*** 
 
(-6.0492) (-5.0144) (-13.0037) 
[-5,5] -0.0031 -0.0034 -0.0068*** 
 
(-1.6322) (-1.7285) (-3.4161) 
[-1;1] 0.0037** 0.0048*** -0.0128*** 
  
(3.1981) (3.9565) (-8.8734) 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Observation per 





Table 21: AARs (differentiated) for the main sample – Market-adjusted model 
t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   
-10 -0.0017 -0.0018*   0 0.0056** 0.002***  
 
(-1.2735) (-2.1061) 
   
(2.6012) (4.0983) 
-9 0.0007 0.0000   1 -0.0019 0.0028*  
 
(0.5071) (0.0000) 
   
(-0.5527) (2.3175) 
-8 -0.0044** -0.002***   2 0.0013 -0.0035***  
 
(-2.8707) (-4.8358) 
   
(0.6426) (-3.7230) 
-7 -0.0064*** -0.0037***   3 0.0006 0.0005  
 
(-3.8200) (-7.4451) 
   
(0.3210) (1.1617) 
-6 -0.0014 -0.0032***   4 0.0020 -0.0013**  
 
(-0.8649) (-5.6229) 
   
(1.2474) (-2.7739) 
-5 -0.0006 -0.0024***   5 0.0015 0.0003  
 
(-0.3961) (-4.8823) 
   
(1.0672) (0.6507) 
-4 0.0025 0.0032***   6 -0.0020 0.0024***  
 
(1.2883) (4.6521) 
   
(-1.2585) (3.6940) 
-3 -0.0037 -0.0031***   7 0.0025* -0.0026***  
 
(-1.8349) (-4.5558) 
   
(2.2764) (-4.0796) 
-2 -0.0034* -0.0029***   8 -0.0004 -0.0009  
 
(-2.2390) (-6.0956) 
   
(-0.2365) (-1.9012) 
-1 0.0013 0.0000   9 0.002 0.0014*  
 
(1.0401) (-0.0103) 
   
(1.5854) (2.0566) 
     10 0.0018 0.0009  
          
(1.3815) (1.3478)   
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market-adjusted 





Table 22: CAARs (differentiated) for the main sample – Market-adjusted model 
Window SOE_CAAR Non-SOE_CAAR 
[-10;10] -0.004 -0.0142*** 
 
(-0.4480) (-5.1683) 
[-5,5] 0.0052 -0.0044* 
 
(0.6416) (-2.1803) 
[-1;1] 0.005 0.0048*** 
  
(1.1821) (3.7799) 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Market-adjusted 





Table 23: AARs (differentiated) for the main sample – Mean-adjusted model 
t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   t SOE_AAR Non-SOE_AAR   
-10 -0.0063*** -0.0069***   0 0.0124*** 0.009***  
 
(-4.0895) (-7.6561) 
   
(5.7402) (17.8575) 
-9 -0.0038* -0.0053***   1 -0.0267*** -0.0252***  
 
(-2.1172) (-9.6488) 
   
(-5.8080) (-16.8040) 
-8 -0.0096*** -0.0078***   2 -0.0158*** -0.019***  
 
(-5.4462) (-16.2752) 
   
(-6.9133) (-16.8102) 
-7 -0.0123*** -0.0103***   3 0.0091*** 0.0083***  
 
(-5.9709) (-17.0768) 
   
(4.5233) (15.0390) 
-6 0.0004 -0.0012*   4 0.0091*** 0.0074***  
 
(0.2436) (-2.0465) 
   
(5.1549) (13.1519) 
-5 -0.0072*** -0.0093***   5 0.0057*** 0.0041***  
 
(-4.7129) (-18.2526) 
   
(3.9484) (8.4772) 
-4 0.0076*** 0.0086***   6 0.0001 0.0047***  
 
(3.6426) (11.8419) 
   
(0.0611) (6.9952) 
-3 0.0085*** 0.0101***   7 0.0009 -0.0044***  
 
(3.8655) (12.9865) 
   
(0.7470) (-6.6247) 
-2 -0.0051** -0.0048***   8 -0.004* -0.0043***  
 
(-2.7965) (-8.8203) 
   
(-2.0171) (-7.4513) 
-1 0.0046*** 0.0031***   9 0.0018 -0.0002  
 
(3.6586) (7.4374) 
   
(1.2058) (-0.2771) 
     10 0.0064*** 0.0056***  
          
(4.7442) (8.1352)   
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Mean-adjusted 





Table 24: CAARs (differentiated) for the main sample – Mean-adjusted model 
Window SOE_CAAR Non-SOE_CAAR 
[-10;10] -0.0242* -0.0379*** 
 
(-2.4177) (-12.9981) 
[-5,5] 0.0021 -0.0078*** 
 
(0.2611) (-3.8432) 
[-1;1] -0.0097 -0.0131*** 
  
(-1.8954) (-8.7708) 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Mean-adjusted 
























Table 25: Regression at 20% governmental ownership - OLS 
 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. CAR is the 





Table 26: Regression at 20% governmental ownership - fixed effects 
 
 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. CAR is the 





Table 27: Regression at 20% governmental ownership - random effects 
 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. CAR is the 





Table 28: Regression at 20% governmental ownership with time effects 
 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. CAR is the 
dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. (1) OLS regression, (2) fixed effects regression (3) 




Table 29: Regression at 30% governmental ownership -OLS 
CAR is the dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. SIZE2 is market capitalization divided by 





Table 30: Regression at 30% governmental ownership -fixed effects 
CAR is the dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. SIZE2 is market capitalization divided by 






Table 31: Regression at 30% governmental ownership - random effects 
 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. CAR is the 
dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. SIZE2 is market capitalization divided by 100million. 




Table 32: Regression models at 30% governmental ownership with time-fixed effects 
 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. CAR is the 
dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. SIZE2 is market capitalization divided by 100million. 
In each subsequent regression, one control variable is added. (1) OLS regression, (2) fixed effects regression (3) 





Table 33: Regression with restricted indices -OLS 
 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. CAR is the 
dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. SIZE2 is market capitalization divided by 100million. 
In each subsequent regression, one control variable is added. The model excludes companies listed at the Swiss 




Table 34: Regression with restricted indices -fixed effects 
 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. CAR is the 
dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. SIZE2 is market capitalization divided by 100million. 
In each subsequent regression, one control variable is added. The model excludes companies listed at the Swiss 





Table 35: Regression with restricted indices -random effects 
 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. CAR is the 
dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. SIZE2 is market capitalization divided by 100million. 
In each subsequent regression, one control variable is added. The model excludes companies listed at the Swiss 




Table 36: Regression all models restricted indices -time fixed effects 
 
Note: t-scores in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. CAR is the 
dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. SIZE2 is market capitalization divided by 100million. 
In each subsequent regression, one control variable is added. The model excludes companies listed at the Swiss 





Table 37: TEMPER variable by day 
Date 1 -1 0 Total Temper 
6/8/2016 299 262 397 958 0.03862213 
6/9/2016 575 853 1118 2546 -0.1091909 
6/10/2016 216 248 293 757 -0.0422721 
6/13/2016 196 361 443 1000 -0.165 
6/14/2016 516 323 492 1331 0.14500376 
6/15/2016 1206 1375 1282 3863 -0.0437484 
6/16/2016 513 678 553 1744 -0.0946101 
6/17/2016 195 327 246 768 -0.171875 
6/20/2016 243 638 535 1416 -0.2789548 
6/21/2016 763 1116 1261 3140 -0.1124204 
6/22/2016 694 1169 1164 3027 -0.156921 
6/23/2016 743 800 1432 2975 -0.0191597 
6/24/2016 9217 6660 8664 24541 0.10419298 
6/27/2016 1015 1800 1508 4323 -0.1815869 
6/28/2016 802 1167 1389 3358 -0.1086957 
6/29/2016 878 1748 1171 3797 -0.2291283 
6/30/2016 1046 1024 1280 3350 0.00656716 
7/1/2016 780 808 1090 2678 -0.0104556 
7/4/2016 773 1102 1021 2896 -0.113605 
7/5/2016 623 886 942 2451 -0.1073031 
7/6/2016 366 443 681 1490 -0.0516779 
7/7/2016 999 650 769 2418 0.14433416 
Total 22359 24176 27334 73869 -0.0245976 
Note: TEMPER is the is the sentiment variable retrieved from tweets. The definition is found in chapter 3. 1 




Table 38: Regression with TEMPER 
AR is the dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. SIZE is divided by 10million. In each 





Table 39: Regression model with interaction term 







Table 40: Regression model with interaction (TEMPER as binary) 
Note: AR is the dependent variable. SOE threshold 30% state ownership. SOE#c.TEMPERpos is the interaction 





Table 41: Regression models with lagged TEMPER 
AR is the dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. SIZE is divided by 10million. In each 
subsequent regression, one control variable is added. SOE threshold 30% state ownership. TEMPER1 is the 





Table 42: Regression model with interaction term (lagged TEMPER) 
AR is the dependent variable. Regressors are described in chapter 3. SIZE is divided by 10million. In each 
subsequent regression, one control variable is added. SOE threshold 30% state ownership. TEMPER1 is the 
variable TEMPER lagged by one day. SOE#c.TEMPER1 is the interaction term.  
 
